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Being a Physician and Being Ethical 
by 
Arthur J. Dyck, Ph.D. 
The author is a member of the Editorial Advisory board for The Linacre. 
Being a physician is being ethical. There is no morally neutral definition of 
being a physician. We cannot simply describe what it means to be a physician 
without thereby describing attitudes and actions which are ethical at their very 
core: Being a physician is being an individual with the knowledge and skills, the 
attitudes and loyalties, required to prevent and cure diseases, and to alleviate pain 
and suffering. The moral praise worthiness of such activities is not generally in 
dispute. 
But what if being a physician includes assisting in a suicide, or engaging in 
mercy killing, or both? Shall the dictionary then have to redefine "physician," 
"doctor of medicine?" "Medicine" now is defined as "the science and art dealing 
with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of 
disease."l Are some physicians, and some of the public, now asking physicians 
and the general public to understand that assisting in a suicide or mercy killing, if 
added to the practice of medicine, will perfect it? How perfect it? By going 
beyond the mitigation of suffering to its elimination. But if this is added to what it 
means to be a doctor of medicine, is being a physician still synonymous with 
being ethical? The struggle over the correct answer to that question is of deep 
concern to both physicians and ethicists, and, for that matter, all of humanity. 
But the proper answer to that question will not come to those who conceive of 
the physician'S task in the way it is depicted in Webster's Ninth Collegiate 
Dictionary, as cited above. According to Edmund Pellegrino, medicine "is not 
science, but an art, informed both by science and ethics."2 Medicine applies the 
knowledge obtained from science and ethics to the "alleviation of suffering, or the 
cure, care, or prevention of human illness."3 The sociologist Eliot Friedson also 
regards medicine as applied knowledge but considers science to be the distinctive 
and sole source of its knowledge. And, though there has been some more general 
rec0gnition in the past twenty years that ethics may contribute to medicine, 
Pellegrino's evocation of theology and theological ethics is insufficiently 
appreciated. And it is necessary to think theologically in order to understand and 
to practice medicine. 
My contention is that what separates those who favor assisting in a suicide 
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and mercy killing from those who oppose such practices is a different theological 
perspective. I wish to examine the presence of these differing theological 
perspectives within two important court cases. It is important to realize that 
theological assumptions and formulations are being made in settings which are 
assumed to be free of theological and religious thinking, and that these 
theological assumptions and formulations can, and do, make all the difference in 
some cases. I wish, then, to contend as well, that being a physician and being 
ethical is, in part, informed and shaped by one's theology. This I will illustrate by 
exploring how theology frames our conceptions of 1) the nature and bases of 
human rights; and 2) the nature and bases of virtue. In the first instance, I will 
relate human rights to the questions around assisting in a suicide and mercy 
killing. In the second instance, I will focus on the virtue of love or charity. 
A. Theological Perspectives on Human Rights 
There are three major traditions represented within the majority and dissenting 
opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the Brophy case.4 These 
traditions are all alive and functioning. They are a source of some major conflicts 
over ethical issues in the United States and in many other nations. I refer to the 
following three traditions: 1) the tradition of calculated rights (Utilitarian and 
Libertarian); 2) the tradition of natural rights (Hobbesian and Lockean); and 3) 
the tradition of natural obligations (all major religions and many philosophies 
drawing on them). 
1. The Tradition of Calculated Rights 
This was the theological perspective of the majority opinion in the Brophy case 
as delivered by Judge Liacos. First, some facts about the case. 
Paul Brophy, a firefighter in his mid-forties, was diagnosed as being in a 
semi-vegetative state from April of 1983 and at the time of the decision in 
September of 1986. All therapeutic medical interventions were being withheld 
and Brophy was breathing on his own. His care could best be described as aimed 
at "comfort only" and it was excellent. He was free of bed sores, for example. 
Food and water were being given through a G-tube and it was not creating any 
adverse side effects. Medical experts testified that Brophy was not imminently 
dying and that he could live for a number of years, perhaps more than twenty or 
so. The majority, five of nine justices, was convinced that a lower court correctly 
understood Brophy's comments to others earlier in his life as a wish on his part to 
be allowed to die under these circumstances. He had, for example, once said that 
he did not wish to live if he were to be in a situation like that of Karen Ann 
Quinlan. 
The question, then, as Judge Liacos frames it, is whether there is a state interest 
to implement this wish, one that supersedes any other possible state interest to the 
contrary. Liacos asserts that state interest in carrying out Brophy's alleged wish 
by citing a right of self-determination which he regards as having deep roots in the 
history of the United States. To make his argument, he quotes John Stuart 
Mill: 
August, 1992 83 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercized over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a significant warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do 
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right.s 
Liacos feels compelled to offer additional reasons for depicting Brophy's wish, 
and the state's interest in carrying it out, as expressing a reasonable choice to die a 
natural death rather than to be the subject of life-sustaining care. He considers 
Brophy to be in a situation in which efforts to sustain life are in conflict with 
medicine's obligation to relieve suffering. In what sense, however, can Brophy be 
considered to be suffering? He argues that Brophy is in some kind of twilight zone 
in which "the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) 
does not."6 On this very point, he cites another court case in which medical 
procedures used to sustain life in such circumstances are said to be "accurately 
described as a means of prolonging the dying process rather than a means of 
continuing life."7 And he also cites other sources that speak of such continuation 
of medical intervention as "protracted agony" and the choice to forego it as "a 
right to die with dignity."8 In short, Liacos is contending that individuals should 
be free to assert a right not to live under certain circumstances. 
Within the majority opinion, as delivered by Liacos, no inalienable right to 
life, under the protection of the state, is asserted on behalf of Brophy. Rather, a 
right not to be interfered with is set forth, a private sphere in which the value of 
one's life may be calculated by the individual. Effectively, the state has no interest 
in protecting a life that is not desired. Justice Stevens of the U. S. Supreme Court 
is explicit about this in his dissenting opinion regarding the case which involved 
Nancy Cruzan: "A State that seeks to demonstrate its commitment to life may do 
so by aiding those who are actively struggling for life and health."9 Liacos sees no 
struggle for life in Brophy, and Stevens sees none in Cruzan. Nor do they regard 
such a struggle as something individuals in their circumstances would wish to 
carryon. And, so, a state need have no compelling interest in each individual life, 
for the right to life is not inalienable and it may understandably be wished away. 
But why am I thinking of the views of Liacos and Stevens as theological? 
Religious faith is directed at an object of ultimate devotion and ultimate 
authority. What Liacos and Stevens are doing is investing in the individual selves 
the ultimate authority over whether they live or die. Liacos and Stevens might 
wish to counter this by claiming that the state has some authority too and it 
limits, in some circumstances, this authority of the individual. Even so, there are 
those whose theology would not grant the kind of authority to individuals 
granted them by Liacos and Stevens. Indeed, the other two traditions represented 
in the Brophy decision would not make the obligation to protect life contingent 
on whether or not individuals and states decide that they have such an obligation 
in one context or another. 
2. The Tradition of Natural Rights 
Of the seven judges in the Brophy decision, three wrote dissenting opinions. 
Justice Lynch dissented because, as he said, "My principal objection is that the 
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State's interest in the preservation of life has not been given appropriate 
weight"10 And, Lynch adds, "the majority nullify, if only in part, the law against 
suicide."11 For Lynch,.the State's interest in the preservation oflife is an interest in 
preserving the particular patient's life and in preserving the sanctity of all human 
life. "Maintaining the sanctity of life," says Lynch, "may well be the reason 
society invests the State with sovereign authority."12 Lynch mentions both 
Hobbes and Locke as sources for this view. 
Strictly speaking, if Lynch were to state his case in purely Hobbesian terms, the 
reason for submitting to a sovereign is to preserve one's own life. This they do in 
their quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain. Left to themselves, without a 
sovereign power to curb them, individuals would live in a state of war, seeking 
things for themselves, and endangering their lives and those of others in their 
greed. Since, for Hobbes, the drive to preserve one's own life is a powerful and 
natural one for everyone, he argued that the right to life is natural, and it is a claim 
no rational individual would surrender to a sovereign. Indeed, the legitimacy of 
governments rests on their actual ability to protect human life. To commit 
suicide, from a Hobbesian perspective, is irrational and efforts should be made to 
prevent it Lynch does explicitly see the State's interest in the prevention of 
suicide as that of "the prevention of irrational self-destruction."13 Not all refusal 
of treatment is to be regarded as an instance of such irrational self-destruction. 
But, in Brophy's case, what is being refused is not burdensome and invasive, and 
its refusal will be the reason he dies, and so there is reason to invoke the state's 
interest in preventing what can be seen as a suicide. For the sake of caution, 
Lynch would favor preserving Brophy's life, insofar as the provision of food and 
water is involved. 
Lynch, however, is not expressing his opinion in a purely Hobbesian way. He 
speaks of a state interest in preserving the sanctity of all life. This puts one in mind 
of the Declaration of Independence in which the self-evident and inalienable 
right to life is bestowed on the individual by the Creator. How consistently 
Hobbesian Lynch is in his thinking is not something one can glean from what he 
says in his dissenting opinion. What is clear is that individuals have a definite right 
to life and to the State's protection of that right, including also protection against 
irrational destruction by individuals of their own lives. In Hobbes, the theological 
basis for this affirmation is a doctrine of human nature, one that depicts 
individuals as seeking their own preservation. No one can be expected to regard it 
as reasonable to ask or require anyone to relinquish the right to preserve one's 
own life. Indeed, it is not even possible to take away a right that belongs to 
individuals by their very nature, hence inalienable. In this tradition, rights, not 
obligations, are primary. But a third tradition was represented in that Brophy 
decision in which obligations are primary. 
3. Rights based on Natural ObUgations 
Justice Nolan feels compelled, not only to dissent, but also to wrjte a separate 
opinion. Though, like Lynch, he asserts a state interest in protecting Brophy's life 
and all of life; and though, like Lynch, he views removing food and water in this 
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case as the proximate cause of death, he wishes to delineate what he regards as the 
basis of U.S. laws: 
I can think of nothi·ng more degrading to the human person than the balance the court 
struck today in favor of death against life. It is but another triumph for the forces of 
secular humanism (modem paganism) which have now succeeded in imposing their 
anti-life principles at both ends of life's spectrum. Pro dolar.14 
Nolan explicitly evokes a religious and theological difference between his 
perspective on life and that of the majority. He wishes to put that theological 
quarrel into the record. 
As Nolan is aware, modern paganism thinks of itself as secular but that does 
not mask its affinity with its ancient expressions which were religious rivals of 
Christianity and Judaism. Before Greece embraced Christianity, Greek 
physicians did administer poisons. This was true despite the fact that the 
Hippocratic Oath, an ancient Greek document, prohibited giving poisons and 
doing abortions. That Oath did win out but it did so as Christians embraced it, 
and Christianity came to supplant ancient Greek and Roman religions and 
cultures. 
Nolan's affinity for a certain Christian view is abundantly clear. He notes that 
the principle of double effect does not apply to Brophy's situation. Since the 
G-tube was in place, food and water were not at that point of a medical 
intervention. To deny Brophy food and water is therefore to intend death rather 
than comfort as such. Nolan does accept the withdrawal of all medical 
interventions for the sake of comfort but not for the sake of death, even if the 
decision to avoid all burdensome treatments may have the unintended effect of 
shortening life. But Brophy's death will be due to starvation, and in approving his 
death, Nolan contends that the court is approving euthanasia and suicide. And, 
says Nolan, "Suicide is direct self-destruction and is intrinsically evil. No set of 
circumstances can make it moral."IS Although Nolan does not speak of rights in 
his opinion, there is no doubt about his rejection of any "right" to commit suicide 
or to request euthanasia. Asserting such "rights" would be to ignore the moral 
obligation to avoid actions aimed at killing oneself or having oneself killed. 
Nolan is exhibiting the Christian perspective, shared by the Jewish tradition, in 
which obligations, not rights, are the primary moral concepts. I wish to illustrate 
briefly the significance of this. 
Whereas Hobbes and Locke depict human beings as striving to preserve their 
own lives, the Jewish and Christian traditions have a social concept of human 
striving. Indeed, one can identify natural moral obligations by asking what is 
logically and substantively requisite for the formation and sustenance of human 
communities. Among the requisites of community are the obligations to refrain 
from killing, ourselves and others, and to procreate and nurture our lives and 
those of others. Such nurture includes sustaining our parents in their old age, and 
thus honoring them. 16 This obligation to bring others into being and to nurture 
their lives, a natural proclivity for human beings, is not recognized as such by 
Hobbes and Locke. In turn, Mill recognizes no natural obligation to refrain from 
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killing ourselves; the natural basis for deciding whether to continue our own lives 
rests on our quest to experience pleasure and avoid pain. From this perspective 
life itself can be reasonably viewed as too painful or devoid of pleasure to sustain. 
What, then, are rights, given the Jewish and Christian acceptance of certain 
natural obligations? A right is the expectation that these natural obligations will 
be fulfilled and observed in human relations. I have a right to life because others 
are obligated to refrain from killing me and to nurture me. Individuals can claim 
as a right that such obligations be met and fulfilled. The state has as one of its 
fundamental purposes the enforcement of the obligations to refrain from killing 
and to nurture. We have laws not only against murder, for example, but also 
specifically against child neglect and abuse. Starving one's child would be a 
failure to nurture, which, even short of the child's death, would justify 
intervention. The right to nurture and the protection of one's health and life is 
actualized by the obligations regarded as naturally binding and requisite to the 
sustenance of our communal life as well as of the life of a helpless and dependent 
child. The right to life is not some attribute of the child or a claim it makes, but 
rather identifies what is owed that child by those who made and make its life 
possible, and who in tum owe their lives to the restraint against killing and 
nurture exhibited by others, individually and communally. 
The professing Christian and Jew will likely see these natural obligations, on 
which the actualization of human rights depend, also as Divine commands, part 
of what it means to love God and neighbor. Nevertheless, these naturally 
occurring requisites of community are known by our cognitive faculties and they 
are binding on all human beings. If these Divine commandments were not also 
recognizable by our natural faculties, God's judgment of our lives would be 
grossly unfair, insofar as God would have created us without the ability to 
recognize what God as the ultimate judge of our actions expects of us. 
We have briefly reviewed three differing theological traditions regarding the 
foundations of human rights. In the tradition of calculated rights, Mill can affirm 
the rationality of suicide and assisting in it, since it is a calculus of the individual's 
own happiness, or lack of it. And, it is our nature as humans to seek our own 
pleasure (happiness) and to avoid pain (unhappiness). Where only the 
individual's calculus will not harm others, interference in the freedom to make this 
calculus and act on it is an unjustified deprivation of individual freedom. In the 
Hobbesian and Lockean tradition of natural rights suicide is irrational and the 
effort to prevent it keeps the individual from an act that is not an expression of 
freedom, that is, of being in rational control of one's decisions. This is so because 
human beings naturally seek to preserve their own lives, not to destroy them. In 
the Jewish and Christian traditions, suicide and assisting in a suicide have been 
regarded as morally wrong. Refraining from killing ourselves and others and 
nurturing our own lives and those of others are an expression of our natural 
proclivities to form and sustain communities. To act in accord with what is 
requisite to forming and sustaining human relations and cooperative action is an 
expression of freedom; to act against these requisites of community is to act 
against our own natural proclivities and lose our freedom to realize our nature 
and destiny as human beings. 
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In this day and age, it is not possible to take for granted that those who profess 
to be Jewish or Christian will reflect the doctrine of human nature which has 
dominated the theology of these traditions; they will not necessarily find the 
foundations for human rights in these natural obligations which are an expression 
of our social nature, and render possible and actual our communal life and 
individual life itself. Of course, one could argue that if professing Christians and 
Jews affirm perspectives found in Hobbes or Mill, then these perspectives 
become part of Christian and Jewish traditions. Be that as it may, what I have 
tried to illustrate so far is that what we think theologically about the nature of 
being human does make a difference with respect to whether or not suicide and 
assisting in a suicide are ethically acceptable and hence whether or not the 
physician who assists in a suicide or engages in mercy killing can still be regarded 
as ethical. 
B. Theological Perspectives on Virtue 
To illustrate the significance of theology for what we regard as virtuous, I wish 
to focus on the virtue of charity. When I speak of charity, I am speaking oflove, 
of compassion, that is, of an ingredient that all agree should be found active 
within the physician/patient relation. 
Edmund Pellegrino, in the same article already cited, refers to "love" as 
"charity" and depicts it as a theological virtue.17 For Pellegrino this virtue has at 
least two important manifestations: 1) It limits the pursuit of self-interest, such as 
the pursuit of fees, fame, or the unwillingness to treat risky patients, whether 
legally risky or infectious, like AIDS patients; 2) It limits the "right to privacy" in 
certain ways so that, for example, physicians have no obligation to terminate a 
life, should not conceal a person's AIDS infection from a spouse, and should not 
assert their autonomy to do research to justify aborting a fetus for that purpose. 
Pellegrino, at least in the article in question, appears to treat charity as a 
distinctly Christian virtue. I do not wish to take up that aspect of his essay here. 
Rather, I wish to argue that love as a limitation on self-interest and a right to 
privacy is a theological virtue, and as such is, in certain respects, a virtue required 
of all physicians and not Christians only. 
1. Love as a Limit to Self-interest as an Ultimate Loyalty 
There is a general consensus that physicians should serve the best interests or 
good of their patients. To do this requires, among other things, an impartial 
perspective. Suppose, however, that a physician's primary loyalty is to wealth, or 
fame, or safety. Anyone ofthese, or all ofthem, may become a god or gods when 
the physician's own self interest is god, that is the ultimate object of veneration 
and loyalty. Even when wealth, or fame, or safety are not ultimate objects of 
devotion but yet devoutly sought, they literally constitute interests in a conflicting 
relationship with the good of the patient, especially when the patient is poor, or 
risky to take on. 
Worship of one's self and making one's own good our primary desire 
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undermine an important assessment of what will attain what is good for the 
patient. The self is always at best a partial perspective from which to make 
judgments and decisions. So one way in which we try to achieve an impartial 
point of view is by limiting our estimate of our own worth and powers. Another 
way is to love others as we love ourselves. 18 To do this is to draw more positively 
on the knowledge of what we consider good for ourselves and to seek that good 
for others.19 To do this is to love not only ourselves but also others with a love 
similar to the love we have for ourselves. 
It is hard to imagine that physicians who love their patients as they love 
themselves would compromise care for a patient for the sake of cost 
containment. In the Good Samaritan story, told to illustrate what it means to 
love the neighbor as oneself, the Samaritan provides money to treat a person 
described as half dead, and promises to provide more, if more is needed. The 
Samaritan is not a gatekeeper but a gate opener. 
2. Love as a Limit to a "Right to Privacy" 
The Good Samaritan ideal involves love for God, as well as for one's 
neighbors. Love for God is, among other things, love for an ultimately impartial 
judge. The ideal standard of lovingly impartial judgments and practices is not 
found in ourselves, certainly not to a degree that precludes error and uncertainty. 
Love for God, a love in which the self is not the object of our highest devotion, is 
love for the ultimate source of our powers and capacities, includes our ability and 
willingness to love our neighbors as ourselves. 
Love for God, when the self is not god, means also love for the natural 
obligations, the communal bonds, which tie us to one another as human beings. 
"My health" and "my body" are not seen as our own exclusive concerns, and 
what we do about our health and our bodies is seen as affecting others. There is 
no such a thing as harming only ourselves when we do what is hurtful and 
destructive of our health or of our bodies. How I live while dying affects others 
and our communities. Dying is no purely private domain or concern, even when 
it takes place in the relative privacy and intimacy of our own homes. 
Love for God, when the self is not god, means also love for a community of 
worship and of moral instruction. It is in communities of faith and worship that 
inspiration and continued education in theology and virtue can be had. And it is 
in communities of faith and worship that we can express gratitude for the gifts we 
have, and for life itself, for we did not, and could not, endow ourselves, either 
with life or with the capacities we bring to it. Physicians will not be sufficiently 
prepared to serve the good of patients if their loyalties do not go beyond their 
loyalties to themselves and to their scientific and medical communities, to 
include loyalty to communities of worship and moral instruction. 
Moses said all this well just after he was allowed to view the land promised to 
his people and shortly before his death. He said it in a speech to his people as he 
visualizes their entry into the land which is to be their place of worship. In this 
speech he urges them to love God and keep God's commandments, for to 
worship and serve other gods is the way of death: "Therefore," he says, "choose 
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life, that you and your descendants may live."20 
In this essay, I have argued that what it means to be a physician is partly 
shaped and defined by a physician's theological perspective, implicitly or 
explicitly, as the case may be. And, what it means to be a compassionate 
physician is also partly shaped and defined by a physician's theological 
perspective. Thomas Sydenham, a famous seventeenth century (1624-1689) 
English physician, illustrates very well how a theological perspective can 
contribute to defining an impartial and compassionate perspective for 
physicians. I cite three of four things he wishes all doctors to take seriously: 
First, that he must one day give an account to the Supreme Judge of all the lives 
entrusted to his care. Secondly, that all his skill, and knowledge and energy as they have 
been given him by God, so they should be exercized for His glory and the good of 
mankind, and not for mere gain or ambition . . . . And, fourthly, that the doctor, being 
himself a mortal man, should be diligent and tender in relieving his suffering patients, 
inasmuch as he himself must one day be a like sufferer. 21 
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